The main reasons responsible for underperformance of ARCs are as
under:
a. Capital Inadequacy: With the NPAs increasing day-by-day, the current net worth
of all the ARCs put together will be adequate to acquire only 4% of stressed assets from banks (assuming
current capitalisation of all ARCs at Rs.3000 Crore and the same would be spent in 15% cash up front, the
book value of assets that can be acquired by the ARCs would be around Rs.33,000 Crore (sold at 60% book
value), as against the gross NPA of all banks assumed at Rs.8,00,000 Crore)
b. Inability to fund working capital needs of stressed
loans: It is hard to obtain working
capital for a distressed asset and even when it is made available, the cost is very high. Therefore, there
have been very few cases of genuine restructuring thus far.
Note:
The opening up of 100% FDI in ARCs coupled
with the advent of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) has addressed a key challenge faced by
ARCs — their ability to fund the working capital needs of stressed assets to enable a revival.
There are global distressed asset funds that are increasingly seeing an opportunity here. As
things stand, except for a few transactions in the market, ARCs have not been able to acquire
large cases with potential turnaround options in view of the capital constraints and the
absence of skill sets around and operational turnaround. It would be the most apt time for ARCs
to transform themselves into special situation funds with deep operational capabilities to
bring about a long-term revival in the business under IBC. With 100% FDI allowed in ARCs, more
funds can flow in through the FDI route.
The IBC stipulates that a company has a
moratorium of 180 to 270 days once the turnaround plan is implemented. If there is no visible
improvement within that time frame then creditors can press for liquidation. The duration of
270 days that a turnaround plan has to show results seems like a tightrope walk as it is
hostage to business conditions prevailing then. The downside to that is bad asset resolution
could degenerate into an asset flipping game.
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c. Valuation mismatch: New capital norms have significantly increased the cost of
asset acquisition for ARCs. To offset this, ARCs have been seeking higher discounts to buy NPAs; however,
banks are unwilling to reduce price, resulting in an expectation mismatch. This has led to a sharp decline in
the transaction closure rate.
The main reason for this gap appears to be the vastly different
discounting rate used by banks and ARCs. While banks use discount rates in the range of 10% to 15%, given their
access to cheap capital in the form of public deposits, ARCs use much higher discount rates of 20% to 25% as their
cost of funds is relatively higher than that of banks. Without realistic valuation guidelines, there is no
incentive for private investors to participate in auctions as the reserve price tends to be high, given the low
discount rate used by banks vis-à-vis ARCs and private investors.
d. Prolonged focus on agency model: Till August 2014, Indian ARCs were driven completely by
the agency business model of generating plush internal rates of return (IRRs) based on the management fee.
Since IRRs were topping 20%, ARCs had no real incentive to really opt for recoveries or rehabilitation.
However, after the keynote change of increased investment to 15% and basing the management fee on the lower
spectrum of NAV, ARCs are gradually turning to fund-based models, with a focus on recoveries and realistic
pricing.
e. Lack of mature secondary market for SRs:
Due to an unrealistic pricing mismatch,
intense scrutiny and regulatory changes, there is a general lack of investor appetite that is leading to the
absence of a secondary market for SRs. Banks are hence forced to buy SRs backed by their own stressed assets.
Currently, over 80% of SRs are held by seller banks themselves.
f. Lack of professional expertise for turnaround:
Professionals such as bankers, lawyers and
chartered accountants who join ARCs usually expect employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) as a major mode of
compensation. Since any person with more than 9% shareholding in an ARC is designated a ‘deemed promoter’ by
the RBI, this actually deters professionals from joining ARCs because of the responsibility associated with
the ‘promoter’ status. This only increases the cost of functioning of ARCs. The general dearth of talent and
skill sets required to revive and turn around a unit is also a big challenge.
g. Inter Creditor issues: The Indian banking landscape is characterised by a
consortium/multiple lending with different classes of security. This results in significant inter-creditor
issues, which inhibits the prompt implementation of the most appropriate resolution strategy. Most resolution
approaches require the consent of secured lenders, representing 75% of the total debt by value. The
intermediation by ARCs towards aggregations and bringing all stakeholders to a common ground is often
painstakingly slow and causes a loss of value to everyone concerned.
h. Lengthy Resolution Process of NPAs:
NPA resolution in India is complex, tedious
and time consuming. It takes 4.3 years, on an average, for any resolution. The process is long mainly due to two factors: slow
judicial processes with repeated protracted appeals in higher courts of law, thereby delaying judgements
(corporates find grounds to drag debt recovery cases to civil courts and stall the proceedings of tribunals)
and market value of stressed assets remaining much lower than what the banks currently reflect on their
balance sheets. International experience shows that speedy judicial systems are imperative for effective
asset resolution.
i. Regulatory Constraints: ARCs are subject to many regulatory constraints as
summarised below:
Regulation
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Impact
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Net-owned funds requirement increased from Rs.2
crore to Rs.100 crore.
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Smaller players marginalised – consolidation in
industry
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Disclose valuation basis if the acquisition
value is more than the book value
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Cumbersome for stakeholders
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Disclose reasons and details of the assets
disposed of at a substantial discount during a particular year
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Cumbersome for stakeholders
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Upfront payment of 15% cash vs the earlier 5%
due to which ARCs will face capital constraints
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Magnifies capital inadequacy
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Management fees are now to be calculated as a
percentage of NAV instead of acquisition value
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IRR even more difficult to manage
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With foreign capital coming into the distressed market ARCs may
be willing to take more risks and bid for bigger assets. The new capital flows will also address the shortage of
working capital funding that ARCs face when restructuring distressed assets.
Foreign capital is coming in amid the hope that the
implementation of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) will lead to faster resolution and recovery. In India,
recovery has been a slow and painful process. As per the World Bank, the resolution time in India extends beyond
four years (See: Timeless classic) and going by a Crisil estimate, for ARCs, the recovery rate has been 36% and the
average resolution time taken for ARCs has been about five years.
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